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FILM CENSORSHIP UPHELD
Kingsley Inter. Pic. Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y.,
4 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197 (1958), prob. juris. noted,
358 U.S. 897 (1958)
The Board of Regents of the state of New York denied a license
for the showing of the film "Lady Chatterley's Lover,"' finding that
the film portrayed acts of sexual immorality as accepted behavior.2
While the Appellate Division ordered the license issued,3 the New York
Court of Appeals reversed, asserting that the licensing of films under a
standard of sexual immorality is a legitimate state function, and that
immorality can properly be equated with obscenity in order to justify the
use of a prior restraint.4 The previous affirmance by this court of a
license denial by the Board of Regents, under a somewhat different
licensing standard,' and its subsequent per curiam reversal by the Su-
preme Court,6 led to the amendment of the licensing statute and the
form of the standard here challenged. The expansion of the scope of
obscenity by the instant court to include restraint of films on the basis of
a standard of "sexual immorality" and the implementation of this re-
straint by administrative review before general exhibition, are the issues
herein considered. 7
Although recent reversals by the Supreme Court' broadly attest to
1 At the urging of the impotent Lord Chatterley, Lady Chatterley takes
a lover to provide his Lordship with offspring. As depicted by the instant case
"the dominant theme of the film is the exaltation of illicit sexual love in dero-
gation of the restraint of marriage." Kingsley Inter. Pic. Corp. v. Regents of
Univ. of N.Y., 4 N.Y.2d 349, 354, 151 N.E.2d 197, 199 (1958).
2 The statute defines an immoral film as one "the dominant purpose or
effect of which is erotic or pornographic; or which portrays acts of sexual
immorality, perversion or lewdness, or which expressly or impliedly presents such
acts as desirable, accepted or proper patterns of behavior." N.Y. EDUc. LAW
§ 122a.
3 4 App. Div. 2d 348, 165 N.Y.S.2d 681 (App. Div. 1957).
44 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197 (1958), prob. juris. noted, 358 U.S. 897
(1958).
• The statute then required the refusal of a license if the film was "obscene,
indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or [was] of such character that its
exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite crime." N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 122.
6 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 305 N.Y. 336, 113
N.E.2d 502 (1953), re,'zd per curiam, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
7Although the question of "definiteness" is not reached where a lack of a
legitimate state interest appears, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), the
New York court dismisses any criticism of vagueness by stating, "No one will
deny that the Regents of New York State, just as the members of this court,
know what an act of sexual immorality is . . . ." 4 N.Y.2d at 351. But the
constitutional inquiry at this point is whether the standard of "sexual immorality"
conveys a sufficiently definite meaning to potential violators, since "immorality"
alone, as a standard, fails to meet the test. Holmby Prod., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350
U.S. 870 (1955).
8 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 139 F. Supp. 837 (N.D. Ill. 1956),
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the invalidity of "immorality" as a licensing standard, the particular
theory of any one reversal is at best uncertain. The reversal in each de-
cision may generally be accorded to any one of four infirmities: lack of a
legitimate state interest, invalid as a prior restraint, lack of obscenity,
or the vice of vagueness. The inferential weight of the Supreme Court's
citation of Superior Films v. Dep't of Educ. of Ohio9 in their per curiam
reversal of Holmby Prod.) Inc. v. Vaughn,'" cannot, however, be so
easily dismissed. The Holmby case involved a license denial under a
finding that the picture was "immoral and obscene;" but the licensing
board in the Superior Films case denied exhibition of an allegedly harm-
ful "crime picture;" thus no issue of obscenity was involved. Censorship
of motion pictures under a standard of obscenity not being patently in-
valid, the Holmby reversal appears to point specifically toward the in-
validity of film licensing where immorality is the standard employed.
Decisions relied on by the New York court to sustain a state interest
in public morals sufficient to justify film censorship under a standard of
sexual immorality,"1 while containing dicta to that effect, are properly
classified as "time, place and manner" decisions,'" and as such, clearly
distinguishable. These cases justify the restraint imposed because of the
nature of the speech in effecting acts injurious to the public health and
safety, another distinct state interest. While the permissible restraint of
obscenity stems from defect in the speech itself-the lack of ideas of
"socially redeeming importance"l--the suppression of sexually immoral
views impinges upon that vital area where moral ideas compete for social
244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957) (license denial finding film "not decent and im-
morality featured" upheld), rev'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 372 (1957) (inferentially,
film not obscene); Superior Films v. Dep't of Educ. of Ohio, 159 Ohio St. 315,
112 N.E.2d 311 (1953) (license denial finding film "harmful" upheld), rev'd per
curiam, 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ.
of N.Y., supra note 7, (license denial finding film "immoral and tending to cor-
rupt morals" upheld), reqd per curiam, 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Gelling v. Texas,
157 Tex. Crim. 516, 247 S.W.2d 95 (1950) (license denial finding film "not decent
and immorality featured" upheld), reqd per curiam, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
9 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
10 177 Kan. 728, 282 P.2d 412 (1955), req'd, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
"1 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (power to prohibit things bringing
harm to its people) ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1941) (state
interest in social order and morality) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930)
(power to enforce primary requirements of decency).
12 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). A state statute requir-
ing a license for a parade was sustained against the attack of vagueness because
the discretion of the administrator was limited to considerations of "time, place,
and manner."
13 Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Concerning the criticism that ob-
scenity restraint also requires justification by establishing the probability of an
injurious overt act, see Note, 18 Oio ST. L.J. 137 (1957). This note will not dis-
cuss the propriety of Justice Harlan's statement in Roth (concurring in part and
dissenting in part): "IT]he court seems to assume that obscenity is a peculiar
a
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
approval. Where films are denied exhibition because of an immoral
content, expressions of morality are regimented in accordance with the
moral posture assumed by the state; the very nature of the process
necessarily suppresses minority opinions adverse to the view of the state.
Although there were other issues upon which the reversal might reason-
ably have been based, the decision of the Supreme Court in Burstyn v.
Wilson did deny, in one branch of the opinion, that the protection of
religious groups from the effect of sacrilegious films was a legitimate
state interest. This branch of the opinion, grounded as it was upon the
tendency of the process to suppress the expression of minority views,
14
is sufficiently analogous to justify denial of a similar interest here.
Assuming the propriety of sexual immorality as a standard, its
implementation in the form of a prior restraint is questionable. The
statement of Justice Clark in Burstyn, "It is not necessary for us to
decide ...whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly-
drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene
films,"'" is accorded considerable weight by the majority here, but its
validity, if ever established, is even more questionable today."6 What the
Supreme Court has done since then is more significant than what it has
said; the High Court has yet to sanction a single instance of adminis-
trative censorship." The Roth opinion, while recognized as having
established the "prurient interest" test,' 8 also lends tacit approval to the
determination of the fact of obscenity by an adjudicative process wherein
the jury applies the test. Although this implication of Roth is decidedly
limited by the decision in Kingsley Books v. Brown,19 where the majority
sanctioned a process combining an interim injunction with a judge-
determination of obscenity,20 a vital distinction affecting the degree of
free speech invasion still exists between the practical operation of an
adjudicative process on one hand and administrative censorship on the
other.
genus of speech and press, which is as distinct, recognizable and classifiable as
poison ivy. . . ." 354 U.S. at 497.
14 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
15 Id. at 498.
16 Following the U.S. Supreme Court's per curiam reversal of Superior
Films v. Dep't of Educ. of Ohio, supra note 8, the Supreme Court of Ohio in
R.K.O. Radio Pictures Corp. v. Dep't of Educ. of Ohio, 162 Ohio St. 263, 12Z
N.E.2d 769 (1954), unable to secure the required majority to declare an act
unconstitutional, simply considered any licensing act of the Department to be
"unreasonable."
17 Cases cited note 8 supra.
18 "[A] thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal
is to prurient interest. . . ." 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
19354 U.S. 436 (1957) (four dissents, probably highwater mark of per-
missible prior restraint).
20 In the opinion of at least one member of the Supreme Court, the jury,
by representing a cross-section of the community, becomes especially competent
to apply the test for obscenity, and determination by any other method is rever-
19591
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Where the right to show films depends upon a censor's review of
the film before exhibition, the administrative intensity, as compared with
the less frequent and less encompassing action of a local prosecutor, re-
sults in a greater degree of substantial interference with free exhibition.
While the prosecutor's actions are inclined to be selective, depending
upon the nature of the violation and the availability of evidence, the
censor's job is to censor; each and every film must be viewed. This re-
view before exhibition prevents access to community standards. Under a
system of subsequent punishment a particular film may gain such com-
munity approval that an indictment would be dismissed or a verdict
reached favorable to the defendant. Since a license denial represents in
our more populous states a substantial loss in pecuniary gain, each denial
or compulsory deletion tends to suppress the subsequent production and
distribution of films bordering on the substance of previously excluded
films. In contrast, a local exhibitor, in borderline cases, may be willing
to run the risk of subsequent prosecution if a jury trial is accorded.
The right to a judicial determination of the propriety of the film
tends to insulate the trier of fact from the initiator of the action, thus
minimizing the effect of crusading pressure groups. In comparison, film
censorship thus far indicates a tendency to be particularly accessible. 2I
First amendment rights are further imperiled by the creation in some
cases of an appellate tribunal within the censorship machinery, thus in-
sulating administrative discretion from review under constitutional stand-
ards. Once in the state courts, the traditional lack of deference to state
administrative agencies appears to have been replaced by a requirement
that the appellant sustain the burden of showing an abuse of adminis-
trative discretion. 22
At present a statute aimed at the restraint of obscene films satisfies
the minimum constitutional requirements by incorporation of the fol-
lowing; restraint in point of time after exhibition to the general public,
application of the prurient interest test to determine the existence of
obscenity, and a judicial determination of the fact of obscenity. Broad
statutes, similar to the one upheld in the instant case, encroach on the
free exchange of ideas and should not be permitted. Prior restraint in
the form of compulsory review of films before exhibition must likewise
fail if tested by the standard of the Kingsley Books case--a pragmatic
assessment of the substance of free speech suppressed by the operation of
the statute in particular circumstances.23
Arthur F. Graham
sible. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 448 (1957) (concurring
opinion, Brennan, J.).
21 For examples of the influence of pressure groups on the censoring function
see Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 493 (1955).
2 2 See Note, 60 YALE LJ. 696, 698, n.6 (1951).
23 354 U.S. at 442.
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